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This article explains the role of judicial review in European
Community ("EC") Merger Control ("ECMR") by reference to the Airtours
case I and three other important recent judgments of the European Court of
First Instance ("CFI") (Schneider2, Tetra Laval3 and Lagardre4), all
decided in 2002. Article 230 of the EC Treaty, which governs actions for
annulment of acts adopted by the EC Institutions "on the grounds of lack of
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement,
infringement of this [EC] Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its
application, or misuse of powers, '' 5 is considered only in the context of
these cases. General questions of admissibility, evidence and procedure are
outside the scope of this article.
Judicial review of EC competition decisions and decisions under the
EC Merger Regulation6 had been developed by the CFI, without criticism
from the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), to reflect the greater attention
to review of facts that was considered one of the reasons for creating the
CFI with competition law jurisdiction when it was first established in 1989.
Sir Christopher Bellamy QC, when United Kingdom Judge in the CFI,
* QC. Partner, Solicitor Advocate, Ashurst.
Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II- 2585.
2 Joined Cases T-310/01 and T-77/02, Schneider Elec. v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R.
4201.
3 Joined Cases T-5/02 and T-80/02, Tetra-Laval v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 4381.
4 Case T-251/00, Lagarddre SCA and Canal+ SA v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4825.
5 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as
amended by TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).
6 Council Regulation 4064/89/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L395) 1. Corrected version in 1990 O.J.
(L257) 13, amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 of 30 June 1997, 1997 O.J.
(L 180) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation].
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explained the Court's powers of review as follows:
Unlike the federal courts in the United States, the Kammergericht in
Berlin, the Cour d'Appel in Paris, and the soon-to-be-established
Competition Appeal Tribunal in the United Kingdom, an appeal to the
CFI is not an appeal by way of rehearing, at least formally speaking; it is
an appeal by way of judicial review under the four grounds set out in the
Treaty: lack of jurisdiction, procedural error, error of law and misuse of
power.
However, to that somewhat unpromising and limited jurisdiction, over
time by case law have been added three further grounds of review: error
of fact, error of appreciation - and that comes in most in economic
issues, which I will come to in a moment - and absence of reasoning.
The Treaty imposes the very clear obligation on the Community
authorities to give reasons for every decision. The theory elaborated by
the Court is that: if I cannot understand the reasons in the decision, or if
there are no reasons in the decision, then I cannot exercise my role as
judicial reviewer of its legality; and, therefore, I can quash the decision
for lack of reasons. This is quite a useful power, as we will see in a
moment.
On facts, what is the approach? On the primary facts - has a particular
agreement been made; did such-and-such a telephone call take place;
what do the documents prove - I think that one can say that there is now
quite a place for judicial control of whether or not the facts are proved
"to the requisite legal standard." We are somewhat coy about exactly
what the "relevant standard" is; it is not really defined yet in the case
law. But, in practice, it is something quite close to "proof beyond
reasonable doubt," which is in itself quite close to "la conviction intime"
of a Continental judge, or at least "to a very high degree of probability."
So we tend to look very closely at what elements of proof the
Community has before it.
7
The CFI savaged the European Commission ("Commission") merger
prohibition decision in the Airtours case in a detailed exposure of the
defects in the Commission's legal definitions, treatment of evidence, and
the factual and economic analysis of that evidence. 8 In its decision, the
Commission had prohibited the notified merger of Airtours and First
Choice on the ground that the merger would create a collective dominant
7 Sir Christopher Bellamy QC, Anti-Trust and the Courts Roundtable, in FORDHAM
ANNUAL ANTITRUST CONFERENCE 369, 389 (1999).
8 Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.
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position in the United Kingdom short-haul foreign packaged tours market.
The Court's judgment contains a detailed examination of the Commission's
factual analysis, the economic tests for establishing collective dominance
and the application of that concept to the evidence. It held that the decision
was "vitiated by a series of errors of assessment as to factors fundamental to
any assessment of whether a collective dominant position might be
created." 9 Hence, the Court annulled the prohibition decision finding that
the Commission had not "proved to the requisite legal standard that the
concentration would give rise to a collective dominant position."'
The Airtours judgment by the CFI was of little commercial value since
it was two years after the Commission's decision prohibiting the merger.
The CFI now has to adjudicate a claim for damages recently lodged by the
aggrieved merger party, MyTravel Group, formerly Airtours 1 . However, in
the first two major cases decided under the new expedited procedure
introduced on February 1, 2003, the Schneider case and the Tetra-Laval
case, 12 the CFI annulled the Commission mer er prohibition decisions,
applying an equally high standard of review. 3 Some, including the
Commission, believe that the CFI went beyond the scope of its powers of
review under Article 230 of the EC Treaty in the Tetra-Laval case and
claim that the Court substituted its own view for that of the Commission.
For this reason, the Commission has appealed the CFI judgment in the
Tetra-Laval case. 14 Until the ECJ rules on this appeal, uncertainty will
hinder the CFI's review of further EC merger decisions. However, in this
article the CFI's approach to judicial review is analyzed primarily by
reference to Airtours which has not been appealed.
In addition to the substantive and economic issues raised by these
leading cases, questions inevitably arise regarding the adequacy of the
procedural safeguards that allow such substantive errors of assessment in
the Commission's merger control decision-making process. The
Commission itself has made numerous proposals to improve its own
procedures and practice. Ultimately, however, judicial review by the
European Courts remains the essential safeguard for parties involved in EC
Merger Control.
There are a number of mechanisms that have been introduced to
9 Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585, at para. 294.
10 Id.
11 Case T-212/03, MyTravel Group v. Commission, 2003 O.J. (C200) 28, 29.
12 Amends. to the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance of the EC
Communities, 2000 O.J. (L 322) 4, at art. 76(a), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/
en/oj/dat/2000/_322/1_32220001219en00040006.pdf [hereinafter CFI Rules of Procedure].
13 Schneider Elec., 2002 E.C.R. 4201; Tetra-Laval, 2002 E.C.R. 4381.
14 Case C-12/03P, Commission v. Tetra-Laval, 2003 O.J. (C70) 3; Case C-13/03P,
Commission v. Tetra-Laval, 2003 O.J. (C70) 5.
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improve the way the Commission proves its case including clarification or
change of the substantive legal test applied to concentrations which would
significantly impede effective competition, improving the procedural
safeguards and rights of defense to ensure that the Commission obtains
sufficient and unambiguous evidence (access to complaints, status report
meetings and Peer group challenges), and improvement in economic
analysis of the evidence (use of chief economist and related unit).
However, the main proposition of this article is that the role of judicial
review will remain paramount as the only effective available method of
holding the Commission accountable. Accordingly, the standards of the
mechanisms selected will be maintained only if judicial review by the CFI
is fast and of high quality.
This article discusses the standard of proof or "requisite legal
standard" imposed on the Commission by the CFI in the Airtours case
(followed in the Tetra Laval and Schneider cases) as well as suggestions for
improving the speed of the Court's decision-making under the expedited
procedure, including the use of additional judges and a specialist
competition court.
In the first part, the requisite legal standard established by the CFI in
the Airtours case is examined with a view to confirming that the CFI has
not trespassed on the Commission's "margin of appreciation" recognized
when the Court reviews the Commission's economic decision making. The
Airtours and other recent merger cases are cited to illustrate the Court's
application of its previous "convincing evidence" or "cogent evidence"
standard of proof accepted by the Commission in earlier cases such as those
dealing with the accountants mergers following the Kali und Salz case.
The second part highlights the need for Article 225a of the amended
EC Treaty (inserted by the Nice Treaty) to be activated so that a specialist
competition court or judicial panel may be established below (or as part of)
the CFI with a view to accelerating or at least maintaining the speed of the
current expedited procedure, such as that achieved in the Tetra-Laval case.
The third part reviews the Commission's procedure under Article
10(5) of the ECMR following annulment of a merger prohibition decision
by reference to the Kali und Salz and Tetra-Laval cases, and the new text
for Article 10(5) codifying that past practice.
The main conclusions of this article are that in order to meet the
requirements, and avoid the criticisms, of the latest CFI annulment
judgments, the Commission must establish its findings in the following
way:
" by defining clearly the legal test that it applies and explaining how
that test is satisfied;
" by reference to sufficient convincing or cogent evidence to justify
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the conclusions drawn, and
by applying a rigorous economic and factual analysis free from
manifest errors.
II. THE CFI HAS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE COMMISSION TO
BLOCK MERGERS
A. Airtours v. Commission
On June 6, 2002, the CFI overturned the September 1999 Commission
decision blocking the acquisition of First Choice by Airtours.' 5  The
Commission had prohibited the Airtours/First Choice merger on the ground
that the merger would have created a collective dominant position between
the three largest short-haul package holiday companies in the United
Kingdom (previously the Commission's collective dominance cases had
only involved two firms-this was the first time the Commission applied
the collective dominance theory to three firms). 16
This was the first case in which the CFI overturned a negative
Commission Decision under the ECMR. For that reason alone the case has
prompted much interest and has been widely recognized as having great
importance for the quality of future Commission ECMR decisions.'
7
1. The CFI's approach to judicial review under Article 230 of the EC
Treaty
As demonstrated in Airtours and by an apparently similar exercise
carried out by the Court in Tetra Laval and Schneider, there are two main
approaches pursued during its review on appeal under Article 230 of the EC
Treaty. First, the CFI reviews the evidence to verify carefully if the factual
findings are based on cogent evidence. Second, it checks whether the
reasons for conclusions are consistent with those factual findings and,
without substituting its own judgment for the assessment resulting from the
Commission's exercise of its discretion, confirms whether or not the
Commission has made any manifest errors.
The section of the CFI's judgment addressing the first plea alleging
errors in the definition of the relevant product market (and infringement of
15 See Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.
16 id.
P See Case C-30/95, French Republic and Societe Commerciale des Potasses et de
l'azote (SCPA) and Enterprise Miniere er Chimique (EMC) v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. I-
1374. Although the ECJ had annulled the Commission's Kali and Salz merger decision in
1998, the CFI's duty to review Commission ECMR decisions has required it always to pay
careful attention to the findings of fact made by the Commission, which is just what it has
done in the Airtours case.
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the Article 253 of the EC Treaty--duty to state reasons) provides a useful
illustration of the Court's approach to judicial review in the context of
alleged "manifest errors of assessment."' Three main characteristics of the
judicial review approach followed by the CFI can be identified. First, the
test that the court applies is whether or not the Commission's proposition in
question may be regarded as "manifestly incorrect." 19 Second, when the
Commission is assessing the facts and factors that it considers decisive,
with a view toward concluding an issue such as the relevant market
definition, the court recognizes that the Commission has a certain
discretion, the bounds of which will not be exceeded simply by the fact that
the Commission did not consider decisive certain factors which could have
supported a different finding. 20 Third, in summarizing (without criticism),
the applicant's ground for challenge in relation to the allegation that the
Commission's assessment of demand-side and supply-substitutability
was incorrect. The Court described the applicant's manifest error of
assessment claim as a plea of error of law: "as a result of that flaw in the
Commission's reasoning the Decision is vitiated by manifest errors of
assessment and thus an error of law.,
2 1
These three principles can be illustrated by their application in this
section of the judgment where the CFI rejects the applicant's challenge to
the definition of the relevant product market given in the decision. First,
the Court identifies the factors taken into account by the Commission in
reaching its conclusion by reference to the documents before the Court, i.e.
the Court identifies the reasons for the Commission's decision:
The Court notes that it is apparent from the documents before it that the
Commission took account of consumer preferences, average flight time,
the level of average prices and the limited interchangeability of the
aircraft used for each type of destination in reaching its conclusion that
short-haul package holidays belong to a separate market from that to
which long-haul package holidays belong.
22
Second, the Court then reviews those reasons to establish whether or
not the Commission made a manifest error of assessment: "the Court must
therefore consider whether the Commission made a manifest error of
assessment when it concluded that those factors were reasons for defining
the relevant product market narrowly and excluding long-haul package
holidays which it did not regard as sufficiently interchangeable with short-
18 Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585, at paras. 19-47.
19 Id. at para. 41.
20 Id. at para. 44.
21 Id. at para. 21.
22 Id. at para. 25.




The applicant disputed the relevance of average prices as a means of
comparing the effect of prices on the consumers' decisions where the
products are clearly differentiated. The applicant submitted that the
behavior of customers at the margin and the question of whether they would
be prepared to substitute long-haul package holidays for short-haul
packages if the price of the latter were to rise is significant for defining the
relevant product market. The Commission's position was that while
average prices do not necessarily reflect prices at the margin, where the
differences are so significant, as in the present case, it is unlikely that a
sufficient range of generally comparable long-haul package holidays is
available at prices which are sufficiently similar to constrain prices of short-
haul packages, since the long-haul packages concerned are regarded as
genuine substitutes by only a very small proportion of the customers.
Accordingly, in this particular context the Court said it was appropriate
to consider whether the Commission made a manifest error of
assessment in relation to the significance of the margin, that is, the
number of customers prepared to react on a price increase in short-haul
package holidays by purchasing a long-haul package holiday, as
compared with the total number of customers who habitually purchase a
short-haul package holiday from tour operators.
24
A review of the relevant documents before the Court established that
the Commission's assessment that none of the long-haul destinations cited
by the applicant in its reply to the statement of objections, in support of its
view on price convergence was in the same price-range as that which it
previously supplied, were well founded.25 The Court concluded: "in those
circumstances, the Commission's proposition that only a small proportion
of the customers of the main United Kingdom tour operators regard long-
haul package holidays as substitutes in terms of value for money for short-
haul package holidays cannot be regarded as manifestly incorrect." 26
Although the applicant advanced other arguments, the Court rejected
them by reference to the Commission's discretion:
however, in the circumstances of the present case and with reference to
market definition, the fact that the Commission did not consider
decisive: (i) changing consumer tastes; (ii) the growing importance of
substitutability between long-haul package holidays for destinations
such as Florida and the Dominican Republic and short-haul packages; or
23 Id. at para. 36.
24 Id. at paras. 31-32.
25 Id. at para. 36.
26 Id. at para. 41.
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(iii) the growth of the market for long-haul packages over recent years is
not sufficient to support a finding that the Commission exceeded the
bounds of its discretion in concluding that short-haul package holidays
are not within the same product market as long-haul packages.
2. Substantive tests for collective dominance in Airtours
In addition to outlining the CFI general approach to judicial review
applied when it reviewed the Commission's decision in Airtours, it is also
relevant to set out the substantive legal approach applied by the Court
which contains the tests against which the findings and reasoning of the
Commission's decision on collective dominance were reviewed by the
Court:
[w]here, for the purposes of applying Regulation No 4064/89, the
Commission examines a possible collective dominant position, it must
ascertain whether the concentration would have the direct and
immediate effect of creating or strengthening a position of that kind,
which is such as significantly and lastingly to impede competition in the
relevant market. If there is no substantial alteration to competition as it
stands, the merger must be approved (see, to that effect, Case T-2/93 Air
France v. Commission [1994] ECR 11-323, paragraphs 78 and 79, and
Gencor v. Commission, paragraph 170, 180 and 193).
It is apparent from the case law that 'in the case of an alleged collective
dominant position, the Commission is... obliged to assess, using a
prospective analysis of the reference market, whether the concentration
which has been referred to it leads to a situation in which effective
competition in the relevant market is significantly impeded by the
undertakings involved in the concentration and one or more other
undertakings which together, in particular because of factors giving rise
to a connection between them, are able to adopt a common policy on the
market and act to a considerable extent independently of their
competitors, their customers, and also of consumers.'
The Court of First Instance has held that:
'There is no reason whatsoever in legal or economic terms to exclude
from the notion of economic links the relationship of interdependence
existing between the parties to a tight oligopoly within which, in a
market with the appropriate characteristics, in particular in terms of
market concentration, transparency and product homogeneity, those
27 Id. at para. 44.
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parties are in a position to anticipate one another's behavior and are
therefore strongly encouraged to align their conduct in the market, in
particular in such a way as to maximize their joint profits by restricting
production with a view to increasing prices. In such a context, each
trader is aware that highly competitive action on its part designed to
increase its market share (for example a price cut) would provoke
identical action by the others, so that it would derive no benefit from its
initiative. All the traders would thus be affected by the reduction in price
levels.'
A collective dominant position significantly impeding effective
competition in the common market or a substantial part of it may thus
arise as the result of a concentration where, in view of the actual
characteristics of the relevant market and of the alteration in its structure
that the transaction would entail, the latter would make each member of
the dominant oligopoly, as it becomes aware of common interests,
consider it possible, economically rational, and hence preferable, to
adopt on a lasting basis a common policy on the market with the aim of
selling at above competitive prices, without having to enter into an
agreement or resort to a concerted practice within the meaning of Article
81 EC and without any actual or potential competitors, let alone
customers or consumers, being able to react effectively.
As the applicant has argued and as the Commission has accepted in its
pleadings, three conditions are necessary for a finding of collective
dominance as defined:
- first, each member of the dominant oligopoly must have the ability to
know how the other members are behaving in order to monitor whether
or not they are adopting the common policy. As the Commission
specifically acknowledges, it is not enough for each member of the
dominant oligopoly to be aware that interdependent market conduct is
profitable for all of them but each member must also have a means of
knowing whether the other operators are adopting the same strategy and
whether they are maintaining it. There must, therefore, be sufficient
market transparency for all members of the dominant oligopoly to be
aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in which the other
members' market conduct is evolving;
- second, the situation of tacit coordination must be sustainable over
time, that is to say, there must be an incentive not to depart from the
common policy on the market. As the Commission observes, it is only if
all the members of the dominant oligopoly maintain the parallel conduct
that all can benefit. The notion of retaliation in respect of conduct
deviating from the common policy is thus inherent in this condition. In
Northwestern Journal of
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this instance, the parties concur that, for a situation of collective
dominance to be viable, there must be adequate deterrents to ensure that
there is a long-term incentive in not departing from the common policy,
which means that each member of the dominant oligopoly must be
aware that highly competitive action on its part designed to increase its
market share would provoke identical action by the others, so that it
would derive no benefit from its initiative;
- third, to prove the existence of a collective dominant position to the
requisite legal standard, the Commission must also establish that the
foreseeable reaction of current and future competitors, as well as of
consumers, would not jeopardize the results expected from the common
policy.
28
3. Requisite legal standard to establish collective dominance
After identifying the substantive tests applied by the CFI, which
provide a blue print for collective dominance in oligopolistic markets under
the ECMR, it is also essential to set out the legal standard that the CFI
expects the Commission to meet. That is, what evidence and legal
reasoning will be required where the Commission seeks to prohibit a
merger on the ground that it creates or strengthens a collective dominant
position. The Court notes that its review of the Commission's decisions
will be made in light of the following:
[t]he prospective analysis which the Commission has to carry out in its
review of concentrations involving collective dominance calls for close
examination in particular of the circumstances which, in each individual
case, are relevant for assessing the effects of the concentration on
competition in the reference market. As the Commission itself has
emphasized, at paragraph 104 of its decision of 20 May 1998 Price
Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand (Case IV/M.1016) (OJ 1999 L 50, p.
27), it is also apparent from the judgment in Kali and Salz that, where
the Commission takes the view that a merger should be prohibited
because it will create a situation of collective dominance, it is incumbent
upon it to produce convincing evidence thereof. The evidence must
concern, in particular, factors playing a significant role in the assessment
of whether a situation of collective dominance exists, such as, for
example, the lack of effective competition between the operators alleged
to be members of the dominant oligopoly and the weakness of any
competitive pressure that might be exerted by other operators.
Furthermore, the basic provisions of Regulation No 4064/89, in
28 Id. at paras. 58-62.
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particular Article 2 thereof, confer on the Commission a certain
discretion, especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature,
and, consequently, when the exercise of that discretion, which is
essential for defining the rules on concentrations, is under review, the
Community judicature must take account of the discretionary margin
implicit in the provisions of an economic nature which form part of the
rules on concentrations (Kali & Salz, paragraphs 223 and 224, and
Gencor v. Commission, paragraphs 164 and 165).
Therefore, it is in the light of the foregoing considerations that it is
necessary to examine the merits of the grounds relied on by the
applicant to show that the Commission made an error of assessment in
finding that the conditions for, or characteristics of, collective
dominance would exist were the transaction to be approved.
The CFI's approach to judicial review in the context of collective
dominance can be illustrated by the following extracts from the Court's
judgment in the section upholding the third and main plea which alleged
infringement of Article 2 of Regulation 4064/89 in that the Commission
made an error of assessment since the Decision did not prove to the
requisite legal standard that the concentration would create a collective
dominant position:
30
... it follows from the foregoing that the Commission made errors of
assessment in its analysis of competition obtaining in the relevant
market prior to the notification. First, it did not provide adequate
evidence in support of its finding that there was already a tendency in
the industry to collective dominance and, hence, to restriction of
competition, particularly as regards capacity selling...
3 1
... the Court holds that the Commission's findings are based on an
incomplete and incorrect assessment of the data submitted to it during
the administrative procedure.. 32
•. however, it is apparent from a cursory examination of that document
that the Commission's reading of it. . .". "It follows that the Commission
construed that document without having regard to its actual wording and
overall purpose, even though it decided to include it as a document
crucial to its finding that the rate of market growth was moderate in the
29 Id. at paras. 63-64.
30 See generally, id. at paras. 120-295.
31 Id. at para. 120.
32 Id. at para. 127.
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1990s and would continue to be so...33
As regards volatility linked to the business cycle, the Commission
cannot just conclude as it does.. .that "it is likely that all tour operators
will have similar views as to the market development" without
producing any evidence in support of that statement, given that capacity
34is set initially some 18 months before the start of the season...
... it follows from all of the foregoing that the Commission wrongly
formed a view that market transparency is high for the four major
integrated operators during the planning period. Accordingly, it appears
that it wrongly concluded that the degree of market transparency was a
characteristic which made the market conducive to collective
35dominance...
.. the Court finds that the Commission has failed to prove that the result
of the transaction would be to alter the structure of the relevant market
in such a way that the leading operators would no longer act as they
have in the past and that a collective dominant position would be
created.36
As a result of its searching analysis of the findings in the
Commission's decision, the evidence taken into account by the Commission
and the available evidence which it either did not take into account or had
misunderstood, the Court concluded
that the Decision, far from basing its prospective analysis on cogent
evidence, is vitiated by a series of errors of assessment as to factors
fundamental to any assessment of whether a collective dominant
position might be created. It follows that the Commission prohibited the
transaction without having proved to the requisite legal standard that
the concentration would give rise to a collective dominant position of
the three major tour operators, of such a kind as to significantly impede
effective competition in the relevant market (emphasis added).3
The reason, therefore, that the Court overturned the Commission's
decision is not that it rejected the theory of collective dominance in the
form of collusion on capacity through tacit collusion to which the CFI
effectively equates collective dominance involving three parties. In laying
33 Id. at para. 130.
34 Id. at para. 144.
35 Id. at para. 180.
36 Id. at para. 293.
37 Id. at para. 294.
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down three conditions to establish collective dominance or tacit collusion,
the Court found the Commission lacking in its treatment of the facts rather
than the theory. The three conditions identified by the Court were
transparency, the possibility of retaliation and the absence of actual and
potential external constraints on competition. While these three conditions
are a helpful guide to future collective dominance cases and go beyond the
checklist approach followed by the Commission to date, the Court's
judgment is taken up with testing the Commission's decision in the context
of each of the three conditions and concluding that the Commission's
analysis was at fault on each. In particular, the Commission wrongly found
that the package travel market characteristics were conducive to passive
collusion since there was insufficient market transparency for all firms in
the oligopoly to be aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in
which the other firms' market conduct would develop. Second, any tacit
co-ordination would not be sustainable over time since the retaliatory
measures identified by the Commission are not capable of acting as
adequate deterrents in that way. Third, the Commission underestimated the
counter-balance of competitors as well as customers to destabilize any
expected collusion.
B. Schneider v. Commission
On October 22, 2002, acting for the first time under the accelerated
procedure, the CFI annulled the Commission's decision to force the
divestiture by Schneider Electric SA of Legrand SA.38 On the same day, it
also annulled the Commission's decision ordering the unbundling of
Schneider and Legrand.
1. Flawed economic analysis
The Commission found that the concentration would lead to the
creation or strengthening of a dominant position in 18 distinct product
markets. All product markets were national, nine in France and the rest in
six other Member States. With respect to the product markets outside
France the CFI found "errors, omissions and inconsistencies" in the
Commission's economic analysis.3 9 The CFI criticized the Commission for
basing its assessment of the impact of the concentration in order to
demonstrate the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in that
market on international considerations on an extrapolation from a single
market, without demonstrating an impact at a national level. The Court also
said that the findings relating to wholesalers were supported only by general
data when an analysis at the national level would have been more relevant.
38 Schneider Elec., 2002 E.C.R. 11-4201.
39 Id. at para. 404.
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The Commission had not demonstrated that the large wholesalers lacked
purchasing power, nor that the merged entity would be an "indispensable
trading partner., 40 Moreover, the CFI found that the Commission did not
establish properly the potential portfolio, and unequalled range, of products
in the national markets. It failed to consider the competitive effects of
potential competitors on those markets that also have broad portfolios and
underestimated the main competitor of the merged entity by failing to take
into account their intra-group component sales.
2. Rights of Defense
Although the CFI agreed with the Commission's analysis of the
French market, namely that the concentration would eliminate competition
in France because of the merged entity's considerable market share on
several French product markets, it found that the Commission had
committed a serious procedural irregularity. The CFI found that there had
been a substantial change between the Statement of Objections ("SO") and
the final decision. In particular, the Commission in the SO had stressed the
overlapping activities of the parties, when the decision found that the
parties held dominant positions in two distinct but complementary product
markets. This substantial change constituted a breach of the parties' rights
of defense, a general principle of Community law expressly guaranteed by
Article 18(3) of the ECMR.
C. Tetra Laval v Commission
Shortly after the Schneider judgment, the CFI annulled the
Commission's decision to prohibit the merger between Tetra-Laval, the
world leader in carton packaging, and the French company Sidel, which
was active in the manufacture and sale of equipment and of PET plastic
bottles.42 The Commission's main reasons for prohibiting the merger were
that the parties were active in closely neighboring markets and that the
merger would have enabled Tetra to leverage its dominant position in the
carton processing market into the PET packaging market. The CFI
criticized the Commission's analysis of the horizontal (control of PET
equipment) and vertical effects of the merger as being over-estimated.
However the significant issue was the assessment of conglomerate effects
in merger cases.
40 Id. at para. 198.
41 Council Regulation, supra note 6.
42 Tetra-Laval BV, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381. See also Tetra-Laval, 2003 O.J. (C70) 3; Tetra-
Laval, 2003 O.J. (C70) 5.
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1. Conglomerate Effects
The judgment in Tetra-Laval is of major significance as it is the first
time the CFI has addressed the issue of conglomerate effects.
Conglomerate issues arise when the parties to a concentration are active in
different product markets and do not consequently compete with each other.
The Commission considered that it could not be ruled out that the merger
would give rise to anti-competitive repercussions in the future. The
rationale behind this view is leveraging, where the parties use their
dominant position in one market to become dominant in another, thereby
eliminating potential competition and strengthening the merged entity's
overall economic position.
Although the CFI agreed that the Commission should consider future
conglomerate effects of the merger, it stated that the Commission had failed
to prove properly that the merged entity would have the incentive to utilize
this possibility given the likelihood of detection by national and EC
competition authorities. The Commission should have accepted the
behavioral commitments offered by the parties. The CFI said that the
Commission had not adequately considered the position of competitors and
the price sensitivity of customers. Further, the Commission had failed to
prove that the merged entity would refrain from reducing prices and
carrying out innovative activities as a result of the elimination of Sidel as a
competitor. The CFI, therefore, concluded that conglomerate effects may
only justify the prohibition of a merger where there is sufficient evidence
that it would result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position
significantly impeding competition. Since the CFI considered the
econometric evidence and analysis to be lacking in this respect, it found that
the Commission had committed a manifest error in its assessment that a
dominant position would be created.
If correct, the Tetra-Laval judgment limits the ability of the
Commission to assess conglomerate effects. The Commission has appealed
to the ECJ claiming that the CFI has exceeded its powers of review under
Article 230 of the EC Treaty, as it should have confined itself to reviewing
clear errors of fact rather than substituting its view of the case for that of the
Commission. The Commission considers the burden of proof imposed on it
by the CFI to be disproportionate, as it has to prove not only whether a
company could leverage its dominance in one market to another market but
also how likely it is that this will take place when such behavior would be
unlawful in itself. The Commission also seeks clarification from the Court
as to the approach the Commission should take to behavioral commitments
in merger proceedings.43
Uncertainty, therefore, will continue with regard to the CFI's role in
43 Id.
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judicial review, and in particular in the context of conglomerate mergers
and behavioral safeguards. The Commission, in clearing the subsequent re-
notification of the merger, stated in its press release that the clearance given
"could be affected by the outcome of the Commission's appeal and an
eventual re-examination of the Commission's earlier decision of the Court
of Justice or the CFI, in the event that the matter would be referred back to




D. Lagardbre and Canal+ v. Commission
In June 2002, the Commission had cleared a proposed concentration
between the Lagardre Group, Canal+, and Liberty Media whereby they
acquired joint control of CanalSatellite, a French satellite broadcasting
company, and Multith~matiques, a French TV channel, (including the
notified ancillary restraints) under Article 6(1)(b) of the ECMR.45 In its
decision the Commission declared that the notified ancillary restraints were
directly related to and necessary for the implementation of the
46
concentration.
Subsequently, in July 2002, the Commission modified its decision
stating that the non-compete clauses in the initial decision were not directly
related or necessary to the implementation of the concentration. The
Commission explained that it had to modify its decision to ensure
coherence with a previous decision made under Article 81 of the EC
Treaty.47 This second decision was appealed before the CFI by Canal+ and
Lagard~re on the grounds that the second decision was a retroactive
withdrawal and the Commission had exceeded its powers. The
Commission claimed that the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible
since the findings on ancillary restraints were contained in the reasoning but
not in the operative part of the decision and, therefore, constituted advice
which did not produce legal effects.
1. Ancillary Restraints
The CFI disagreed with the Commission and held that the assessment
of ancillary restraints in the clearance decision did not merely give advice
44 Press Release, E.U. Commission, Commission clears acquisition of Sidel by Tetra
Laval Group (Jan. 13, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/
guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt-gt&doc=IP/03/3610IRAPID&Ig=EN.
45 Council Regulation, supra note 6.
46 Mary Loughran et al., Merger Control: Main Developments between 1st September
2002 and 31st December 2002, 2003/1 COMMISSION NEWSLETrER 84, 88.
47 Press Release, European Commission, Commission clears the creation of the digital
satellite television platform TPS (France), IP/99/161 (Mar. 8, 1999), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/99/1 61 10IRAPID
&lg=EN.
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but was a substantial part of the Commission's decision.48 The Court held
that Article 6(1)(b) of the ECMR not only excluded the application of
Regulation 17/62 to the assessment of ancillary restraints but also conferred
exclusive competence to take a binding act in this respect upon the
Commission. It also resulted clearly from Article 21(1) of the ECMR that
the Commission's exclusive competence regarding the control of mergers is
not limited to compatibility decisions alone as defined in Article 3 of the
ECMR, but extends to all acts with binding effect which the Commission is
called upon to take in application of its role under the ECMR.4 9 In the
CFI's opinion, the Community legislature has created a specific legal basis
for the examination of ancillary restrictions which are notified as such in the
context of a concentration.
The CFI found that the Commission, in its second decision, had
changed substantially a part of its initial decision which amounted to a
revocation of the initial decision. In its judgment, the CFI acknowledged
that the Commission may revoke an illegal decision provided:
* the decision is revoked within a reasonable period of time;
* the Commission establishes the illegality of the decision revoked;
and
* the Commission respects the general principle of legitimate
expectations.
The CFI considered that the Commission failed to outline the grounds
for the illegality of the initial decision. Consequently, the CFI annulled the
Commission's decision. The decision of the CFI alW ears to contradict the
Commission's own Notice on ancillary restrictions, which stated that the
Commission decisions were merely declaratory and not legally binding.
The Notice also stated that the Commission was not obliged to assess and
address formally such restrictions. In rejecting this argument the CFI is
supported by the analogous Commission decision of Reuter/BASF51 that
was endorsed by the ECJ in Remia and Nutrica v. Commission5 2-which
predate the ECMR-where restrictions were held to fall outside Article
81(1) of the EC Treaty because they were objectively necessary for the
performance of a particular contract. The CFI has established that the
Commission must assess ancillary restrictions by virtue of the exclusive
competence it enjoys, provided that the parties request such an assessment.
48 Lagard~re SCA and Canal+ SA v Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4825.
49 Council Regulation, supra note 6.
50 Commission Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations,
2001 O.J. (C 188) 5.
51 Commission Decision 76/743, 1976 O.J. (L 254) 40.
52 Case 42/84, 1985 E.C.R. 2545.
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It is now also clear that ancillary restrictions can only be revoked in
accordance with the limited circumstances outlined by the CFI. The
Legarddre case has been reflected in the new ECMR which provides in
Recital 2 1:
[t]his Regulation should also apply where the undertakings concerned
accept restrictions directly related to, and necessary for, the
implementation of the concentration. Commission decisions declaring
concentrations compatible with the common market in application of this
Regulation should automatically cover such restrictions, without the
Commission having to assess such restrictions in individual cases. At the
request of the undertakings concerned, however, the Commission should,
in cases presenting novel or unresolved questions giving rise to genuine
uncertainty, expressly assess whether or not any restriction is directly
related to, and necessary for, the implementation of the concentration. A
case presents a novel or unresolved question giving rise to genuine
uncertainty if the question is not covered by the relevant Commission
notice in force or a published Commission decision.
5 3
E. Conclusions
The Airtours case (as the Schneider and Tetra-Laval cases) does no
more and no less than require the Commission to prove its case. And it
goes no further than the Court has gone in general competition cases. It is
recognized by the Court that the Commission enjoys a considerable
discretion or margin of appreciation where its decision involves
complicated economic assessments.54  Where a matter falls within the
Commission's margin of appreciation, the CFI will not overrule the
Commission except where there has been a manifest error of appraisal. In
the Dan Air case, 55 Air France argued that the Commission should have
used the power given it by Article 8(2) of the ECMR to impose an
obligation permanently to discontinue the charter operations. The CIF held:
[i]t is in any event not for the Court, in the context of annulment
proceedings, to substitute its own appraisal for that of the Commission and
to rule on the question of whether the Commission should have imposed
an obligation, by means of Article 8(2) of the Regulation, requiring
discontinuance of the activity.
56
53 Council Regulation, supra note 6.
54 See Case T-88/94R, Socidt6 Commerciale des Potasses et de L'Azote and Enterprise
Mini~re et Chemique v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 11-263.
55 Case T-3/93, Air France v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 11-121.56 Id. at para. 113.
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In the Lagard~re case, the CFI has demonstrated its power to ensure
that the Commission does not avoid its legal obligations where the
Community legislation grants it exclusive competence. The principle
established by the CFI may well have implications for the decentralized
allocation of powers under the new Regulation 1/2003 which comes into
force on May 1, 2004, at the same time as the new ECMR.
III. EXPEDITION REQUIRED TO IMPROVE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF MERGERS
The current delays before the CFI in competition and merger cases
have been of as much concern to critics as the alleged inadequate standard
of review. The Commission's Summary of Responses to the EC Merger
Review Green Paper reflected these concerns: "[t]he availability of an
effective judicial review is illusory, on account of the lengthy delays before
appeals can be heard and judgments rendered, as well as because of the
existence of what is perceived by some to be inadequate standard of
review."
57
While the CFI has convincingly demonstrated that it applies as strict a
standard of review in merger cases as in competition cases (though no
stricter), merger control needs to be swift as well as of high quality.
Consequently, the commercial value of judicial review which is untimely
will be no greater than a fast review process of a low standard. There is no
doubt that the workload of the CFI and its own internal working
mechanisms have created an unacceptable level of delay in its decision
making process.
The CFI itself has amended its rules of procedure to provide for an
expedited procedure in Article 76(a). 8 The President of the CFI, Bo
Vesterdorf, has made it clear that the expedited procedure is intended to
benefit merger cases.59  The procedure operates by limiting the written
pleadings to one exchange. The CFI's Practice Directions limit the length
of the application and defense so that in a complex case the applicant may
have to sacrifice weaker grounds for annulment in favor of expedition. 60 It
follows that the oral hearing plays a much greater role both for the court and
the parties. This is borne out by the references in judgments such as
Schneider to the questions and submissions at the hearing. The expedited
procedure evidences the major effort that the CFI is making to reduce
delays but even so there is room to reduce the ten month duration of the
57 Id. at paras. 192, 216-19.
58 CFI Rules of Procedure, supra note 12.
59 Bo Vesterdorf, Recent CFI rulings on merger cases, interim measures and accelerated
procedures and some reflections on reform measures regarding judicial control, Remarks at
the IBA EC Merger Control Conference (Nov. 7-8, 2002).
60 Court of First Instance, Practice Directions, 2002 O.J. (L 87) 48 (issued on March 14,
2002) (hereinafter CFI Practice Directions].
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shortest expedited cases to a period of less than six months. Otherwise, the
commercial value of the judicial review process will be of little
significance.
A. The Expedited Procedure
The possibility of expedited proceedings before the CFI is relatively
new, having been introduced by amendments to the CFI's Rules of
Procedure which came into force on February 1, 2003. A new Chapter 3a
(comprised of Article 76a) was added to the CFI's Rules of Procedure
entitled "Expedited Procedures." In summary, Article 76a provides that:
* an application for treatment of the case under the expedited
procedure may be made by the applicant or the defendant;
* it is entirely at the discretion of the CFI, having heard the parties,
whether to handle the case under the expedited procedure;
* an application for expedited procedure should be made separately to,
but lodged at the same time as, the application or defense;
* replies, rejoinders, statements of intervention and replies to the
intervention will not be submitted where the expedited procedure
applies unless the CFI so requires;
" parties wishing to supplement their arguments and offer additional
evidence during the oral procedure must give reasons for the delay
in making the new arguments or giving the further evidence.
B. Expedited Procedure in Tetra-Laval/Sidel and Schneider/Legrand
Key features of the Tetra-Laval/Sidel and Schneider/Legrand cases
help to explain why these cases were accepted under the expedited
procedure by the CFI and why it is unlikely that the CFI will apply the
procedure save in similarly exceptional cases of urgency.
Article 7(1) of the ECMR prohibits consummation of a merger which
is subject to clearance by the Commission until such clearance has been
received. 61 This prohibition is typically complied with in practice by
agreeing the merger on a legally binding basis but making completion
subject to the condition precedent that ECMR clearance is received.
However, both Tetra-Laval/Sidel and Schneider/Legrand concerned public
bids for companies listed on the Paris stock exchange. French law requires
that such bids must be unconditional.62 It is, therefore, not permitted to
adopt the usual approach of making ECMR clearance a condition precedent
to completion. These two cases are therefore relatively rare examples of
consummated mergers which were subsequently prohibited by the
61 Council Regulation, supra note 6.
62 Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra-Laval/Sidel (Jan. 13, 2003) (not yet published), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2416_62_en.pdf.
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Commission and required to be unwound.
The appeals to the CFI accordingly had a particular urgency because of
the unsettling and potentially disruptive uncertainty for the target businesses
(Sidel and Legrand respectively) whose ownership was in dispute. There
would already have been a reasonably long period of uncertainty for these
businesses while the ECMR investigation took place and the appeal only
served to exacerbate that situation.63 This is likely to have been a key factor
in the CFI's decision to grant expedited status to these two appeals.
However, the commercial urgency does not, in itself, appear to have
been sufficient to merit the fast track procedure. It was also necessary for
the cases to be presented in such a way that expedited handling was
mangeable and in accordance with the practice direction issued by the
CFI. In Tetra-Laval/Sidel, the appeal did not, as it might have done,
attack the prohibition decision in its entirety, but attacked it only "in so far
as it prohibited the merger as modified by the commitments. 65  This
reinforces the indications in the CFI's practice direction that lengthy written
documents are not appropriate in fast track cases. In Schneider/Legrand,
adoption of the expedited procedure was initially refused, in the light of the
length of the appeal and its annexes. The case was only fast tracked
following the lodging by Schneider of a reduced version of its appeal.66
The various steps taken by the CFI in these two landmark cases
enabled it to give judgment within 10 months in both cases. This compares
highly favorably with the timetable for other appeals under the ECMR:
*GE/Honeywell: the appeal was lodged on September 12, 2001, and
is still pending.67
*MCI Worldcom/Sprint: the appeal was lodged on September 27,
2000, and is still pending.
68
C. Institutional Changes to Reduce Delay
A more fundamental change in approach is required to overcome the
delays in the judicial process before the CFI. Unless the radical suggestions
63 In Tetra-Laval/Sidel, the original notification to the EC Commission was made on May
18, 2001. The decision prohibiting the merger was made on October 30, 2001, and the
decision imposing the break-up of the concentration was issued on January 30, 2002.
64 CFI Practice Directions, supra note 60, at 48.
65 Tetra-Laval, 2002 E.C.R. 4381, at para. 81.
66 Schneider Elec., 2002 E.C.R. 4201, at paras. 63-65.
67 Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 74) 6 (merger blocked
by the EC Commission on July 3, 2001), appealfiled, Case T-209/01, Honeywell Int'l Inc.
v. Commission, 2001 O.J. (C 331) 23 and Case T-210/01, General Electric Co. v.
Commission, 2001 O.J. (C 331) 24 (decision pending on both cases).
68 Case COMP/M. 1741, MCI Worldcom/Sprint, 2000 O.J. (C 143) 5 (merger blocked by
the EC Commission on January 11, 2000), appeal filed, Case T-3 10/00, Worldcom Inc. v.
Commission, 2000 O.J. (C 355) 35 (decision pending).
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of those who would like to see the introduction of a U.S. style court
injunction procedure, removing the adjudicative role of the Commission
and replacing it with the court, bear fruit, an enhancement of the resources
available to deal with competition and merger cases must be pursued as a
matter of urgency. In this connection, the provision for creation of judicial
panels to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or
proceeding brought in specific areas has been provided by Article 225(a) of
the EC Treaty (inserted by the Treaty of Nice). 69 The objective must be to
have a specialist competition court whose procedures will allow it to reach a
substantive decision on an appeal from the Commission's merger decision
within a maximum of six months, if not less. This means that a full review
by Commission and Court of a complex merger could take up to 12 months.
While that is probably still too long a period for commercial reality, such a
development might lead to further reduction in both the Commission's and
the Court's timetable.
According to the text of Article 225 (amended by the Treaty of Nice)70
69 TREATY OF NICE AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Mar. 10, 2001,
O.J. (C 80) 1 (2001) [hereinafter TREATY OF NICE].
70 Article 225 reads:
The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance
actions or proceedings referred to in Article 230, 232, 235, 236 and 238, with the exception
of those assigned to a judicial panel and those reserved in the Statute for the Court of Justice.
The Statute may provide for the Court of First Instance to have jurisdiction for other classes
of action or proceeding.
Decisions given by the Court of First Instance under this paragraph may be subject to a right
of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only, under the conditions and within the
limits laid down by the Statute.
The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine actions or
proceedings brought against decisions of the judicial panels set up under Article 225(a).
Decisions given by the Court of First Instance under this paragraph may exceptionally be
subject to review by the Court of First Instance, under the conditions and within the limits
laid down by the Statute, where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of
Community law being affected.
The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine questions referred
for a preliminary ruling under Article 234, in specific areas laid down by the Statute.
Where the Court of First Instance considers that the case requires a decision of principle
likely to affect the unity or consistency of Community law, it may refer the case to the Court
of Justice for a ruling.
Decisions given by the Court of First Instance on questions referred for a preliminary ruling
may exceptionally be subject to review by the Court of Justice, under the conditions and
within the limits laid down by the Statute, where there is a serious risk of the unity or
consistency of Community law being affected.
TREATY OF NICE, supra note 69, art. 225.
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and the new Article 225(a),7' once a competition judicial panel is
established, it will be a tribunal below the CFI with a right of appeal on a
point of law to the CFI. There will be no right of appeal to the ECJ from
the CFI in such a case, but decisions given by the CFI under Article 225(2)
on appeal from a judicial panel may exceptionally be subject to review by
the ECJ under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the statute,
where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Community law
not being effective. Effectively, the first Advocate General of the CFI will
consider whether the decision of the CFI should be re-examined by the ECJ
within one month of the CFI decision. If the first Advocate General
recommends re-examination, the ECJ has an additional month in which to
accept or decline the request. The U.K. government has supported the use
of a judicial panel in the competition sphere and other member states must
be encouraged to support the CFI in its hour of need.
IV. COMMISSION PROCEDURE AFTER ANNULMENT
Article 10(5) of the ECMR provides that: "[w]here the Court of
Justice gives a judgment which annuls the whole or part of a Commission
decision taken under this Regulation, the periods laid down in this
Regulation shall start again from the date of the judgment.', 72
There are a number of ways that Article 10(5) could be interpreted. It
may mean that the whole procedural timetable begins again with an
obligation to notify a merger if clearance is still required. On the other
hand, it may be intended to mean that the procedure terminated by adoption
of the Commission's decision should be re-opened at the stage when the
decision was adopted, i.e. there may be very little time left for the
Commission to adopt a new decision. The effect of the judgment, in any
event, is to require the Commission to re-open the case to take account of
the Court's ruling. As the original notification may well be out of date and
71 Article 225(a) reads:
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting
the European Parliament and the Court of Justice or at the request of the Court of Justice and
after consulting the European Parliament and the Commission, may create judicial panels to
hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or proceeding brought in specific
areas.
The decision establishing a judicial panel shall lay down the rules on the organisation of the
panel and the extent of the jurisdiction conferred upon it.
Decisions given by judicial panels may be subject to a right of appeal on points of law only
or, when provided for in the decision establishing the panel, a right of appeal also on matters
of fact, before the Court of First Instance.
TREATY OF NICE, supra note 69, art. 225(a).
72 Council Regulation, supra note 6.
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need to be made complete before any time limit triggered by the notification
begins, the Commission may need to go through the whole procedure from
notification to decision. This was the approach followed by the
Commission in the only case re-examined after annulment by the ECJ
before the Tetra-Laval case.73
A. Re-examination of Tetra-Laval/Sidel
In the Tetra-Laval case, the Commission re-opened the procedure
requiring a fresh notification. However, the Commission cleared the
merger within the one month first phase time limit regardless of its decision
to appeal certain aspects of the CFI's judgment in that case.7 4 It will be
interesting to see whether the ruling of the ECJ on that appeal will have any
impact on the clearance decision adopted by the Commission to give effect
to the CFI's judgment.
B. Re-examination under the New ECMR
In accordance with the Commission's proposal to codify its current
practice in the new ECMR, Article 10(5) of the Regulation has been
clarified to reflect current practice as to the procedure to be followed where
the Court gives a judgment which annuls the whole or part of a Commission
decision. Such an annulment will, if it relates to a decision that was subject
to a time limit under Article 10, lead to the re-examination by the
Commission with a view to adopting a new decision pursuant to Article
6(1). The new examination will be made in the light of current market
conditions. In such cases, the parties will have to submit a new notification
or supplement the original notification, where the original notification has
become incomplete by reason of intervening changes in market conditions
or in the information provided. Where there are no such changes, a
certification of this fact will suffice.
Beginning May 1, 2004, Article 10(5) will read as follows:
Where the Court of Justice gives a Judgment which annuls the whole or
part of a Commission decision taken under this Regulation which is
subject to a time limit set by this Article, the concentration shall be re-
examined by the Commission with a view to adopting a decision
pursuant to Article 6(1).
73 French Republic and Societe Commerciale des Potasses et de l'azote, 1998 E.C.R. I-
1374. See European Commission, XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998, paras.
175-79, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/annual reports/1998/en/
001_130.pdf, for the description of the procedure that Commission followed after the ECJ's
annulment of the Commission's decision in Kali und Salz.
74 Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra-Laval/Sidel (Jan. 13, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2416 62_en.pdf.
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The concentration shall be re-examined the light of current market
conditions.
The notifying parties shall submit a new notification or supplement the
original notification, without delay, where the original notification has
become incomplete by reason of intervening changes in market
conditions or in the information provided. Where there are no such
changes, the parties shall certify this fact without delay.
The periods laid down in paragraph I shall start on the working day
following that of the receipt of complete information in a new
notification, a supplemented notification, or a certification within the
meaning of the second subparagraph...7
V. CONCLUSIONS
There are three main conclusions to be drawn from the CFI's approach
to judicial review under Article 230 of the EC Treaty demonstrated by
Airtours and the Court's decisions under the expedited procedure.
First, the CFI has shown that it is willing to apply the same rigorous
review that it applies in ordinary EC competition cases to Commission
decisions under the ECMR while recognizing the margin of discretion that
the Commission retains in reaching economic decisions whether or not to
approve a merger. The Airtours case is the first where the CFI has
scrutinized in the greatest detail the factual as well as the legal assessment
by the Commission of a merger decision, following a Phase II investigation
under the ECMR. In particular, the Court identifies from the documents
and evidence before it which factors the Commission took into account and
then determined whether the Commission made a manifest error of
assessment in the conclusions that it made on the basis of those factors.
A. Implications for Future Merger Proceedings
Second, the main lesson to be learned from the approach taken by the
CFI is that the Commission will have to be more professional in its
gathering and analysis of evidence. Put simply, the Commission will have
to use the correct legal tests and apply those tests to the evidence. If the
evidence does not reveal that the legal tests are satisfied, the Commission
must accept as much or its decision will be overturned by the Court. This is
encouraging for future parties in acquisitions and joint ventures which may
involve complex economic issues in markets affected by their merger
75 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.
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transaction since it will justify provision of the full evidence relating to the
competition issues raised by particular transactions in the expectation that
the Commission must reach the correct economic assessment (subject to its
margin of discretion) or the Court will overturn the Commission's Decision.
B. Delays Deprive Judicial Control of Commercial Benefit
Third, while dealing with the substance, the Airtours case does not
deal with the timetable problems facing appeals against misguided
Commission merger decisions. Taking nearly three years, the Airtours case
has been described as a pyrrhic victory for the parties. However, there is
now an expedited procedure intended specifically to benefit merger cases
and the Airtours case itself has focused attention on the unsatisfactory
delays at the CFI. It will be interesting to see the CFI's judgment in the
pending damages case brought by MyTravel Group (formerly Airtours)
against the Commission in connection with the prohibited Airtours/First
76Choice merger.
76 MyTravel Group, 2003 O.J. (C200) 28.
